This is a useful piece, but I think it overstates gubernatorial control as the dominant explanation for legislative turnover and underweights zoning and rotation as independent forces in Nigerian politics. In many senatorial districts, longevity is naturally constrained by pressure to “share” the seat among constituent blocs or sub-zones within the district. This makes Senate seats structurally harder to retain than House seats, where smaller constituencies may allow deeper local entrenchment. Turnover among senators, therefore, does not necessarily prove that governors are dislodging incumbents; it may also reflect local rotation bargains and intra-zone competition.
Similarly, where incumbents lost in direct primaries for legislative seats, the article appears to treat those defeats as evidence of governors imposing preferred candidates. That causal link needs to be demonstrated more clearly. Direct primaries tend to favour candidates with better ground operations and street credibility among party members. In contrast, the old delegate system often gave governors and party executives clearer leverage because they had greater influence over delegate lists and elite bargaining. In my views, the ouster of many incumbents in APC legislative contests reflects more this view as against gubernatorial control. If the argument is that governors still controlled direct primaries in legislative contests through membership registers or party machinery, the article should show with concrete state-level examples.
Thirdly, the claim that consensus was used in the majority of states also needs clearer numerical support. A state-by-state breakdown distinguishing consensus and direct primaries would strengthen the argument. Lagos, for instance, appears to complicate the broad claim if its APC primaries were conducted largely through direct contests. If Lagos is being treated as “controlled” rather than competitive, the basis for that classification should be shown.
Thanks for your comment and I appreciate the critique.
I agree that it does look like a simplification to lay most of the blame on governors. The main message was meant to be that with primaries becoming less of a proper referendum by members and becoming entrenched as an elite coronation process, its becoming easier for gatekeepers to manage these processes. To better manage this, and to avert responsibility for any backlash, party national executives have ended up devolving it to state branches…which end up at governors’ feet. There are admittedly more concerns and factors to negotiate, like zoning as you mention. But in most states, the governors are free and able to direct and dictate procedures.
Communicating this clearly was no doubt a failing on my part and something to look out for in future issues. I look forward to engaging further.
This is a useful piece, but I think it overstates gubernatorial control as the dominant explanation for legislative turnover and underweights zoning and rotation as independent forces in Nigerian politics. In many senatorial districts, longevity is naturally constrained by pressure to “share” the seat among constituent blocs or sub-zones within the district. This makes Senate seats structurally harder to retain than House seats, where smaller constituencies may allow deeper local entrenchment. Turnover among senators, therefore, does not necessarily prove that governors are dislodging incumbents; it may also reflect local rotation bargains and intra-zone competition.
Similarly, where incumbents lost in direct primaries for legislative seats, the article appears to treat those defeats as evidence of governors imposing preferred candidates. That causal link needs to be demonstrated more clearly. Direct primaries tend to favour candidates with better ground operations and street credibility among party members. In contrast, the old delegate system often gave governors and party executives clearer leverage because they had greater influence over delegate lists and elite bargaining. In my views, the ouster of many incumbents in APC legislative contests reflects more this view as against gubernatorial control. If the argument is that governors still controlled direct primaries in legislative contests through membership registers or party machinery, the article should show with concrete state-level examples.
Thirdly, the claim that consensus was used in the majority of states also needs clearer numerical support. A state-by-state breakdown distinguishing consensus and direct primaries would strengthen the argument. Lagos, for instance, appears to complicate the broad claim if its APC primaries were conducted largely through direct contests. If Lagos is being treated as “controlled” rather than competitive, the basis for that classification should be shown.
Thanks for your comment and I appreciate the critique.
I agree that it does look like a simplification to lay most of the blame on governors. The main message was meant to be that with primaries becoming less of a proper referendum by members and becoming entrenched as an elite coronation process, its becoming easier for gatekeepers to manage these processes. To better manage this, and to avert responsibility for any backlash, party national executives have ended up devolving it to state branches…which end up at governors’ feet. There are admittedly more concerns and factors to negotiate, like zoning as you mention. But in most states, the governors are free and able to direct and dictate procedures.
Communicating this clearly was no doubt a failing on my part and something to look out for in future issues. I look forward to engaging further.